Accession as a regional stabilisation factor
Greece
Greek Centre of European Studies and Research
As already mentioned[1] Greece has viewed the Georgia incident under two specific biases. First, a relatively pro-Russian tilt in the country’s foreign-policy equilibrium. Second, the lingering apprehensions rising out of the recent attempts for NATO accession of Georgia, of the Ukraine – and of the FYROM (with potential EU accession negotiations in the background in the case of the latter two countries). This has caused the relatively high support for the ENP in Greece, viewed as an alternative process of stabilisation in the wider area without necessarily leading to accession in the foreseeable future. The natural gas incident between Moscow and Kiev has brought further reservations to the surface.
Tags: A new approach to ‘Europe-building’
Greece
Greek Centre of European Studies and Research
The Sarkozy performance at the helm of ‘Europe’ has been highly rated in Greece, both in political circles and throughout the media/public opinion, despite some sarcastic comments about “a ‘showing-off’ of the French Presidency while the Commission was having intensive lessons on how to manage a crisis”.[1] Sarkozy’s tendency to come forward and take the lead was welcomed, be it in the context of the global (albeit US-initiated) financial crisis where he was instrumental in organising a ‘European response’ (even if he had to concede the effective helm of Eurogroup discussions to – non-Eurozone member – Gordon Brown of the UK) or in the context of the turn-of-the-year Israel/Gaza strip bloody foray where he did not hesitate to push aside the Czech Presidency and its (initially, at least) too hesitant responses especially as it came just after the French Presidency. Indeed, the one thing positively rated in the way the French Presidency was exercised was the lack of emphasis on the institutional aspects of things and the shift to a pragmatic – ‘we have to get results’ – approach, which has been sorely lacking in EU life.
Once more surpassing the threshold of the Stability Pact
Greece
Greek Centre of European Studies and Research
The severe financial crisis, as it has evolved, captured the attention of public opinion as well as of the political system in Greece. Initially the interest was more of a theoretical kind, since the Greek banking system was thought to be less exposed to ‘toxic’ sub-primes and the like; the first major indication that ‘something dangerous was happening’ came when the (then) Greek Minister of Economy and Finance took the lead in Europe (just after the Irish) to call for an increase to the legal bank deposits insurance (to 100,000 Euro) and to a ‘political’ blanket coverage of all deposits. Soon afterwards, a 28 billon Euro salvage package (+/- 10 percent of GDP) was voted in Greek Parliament to support the banking system – exposed as it was discovered to be to Southeastern Europe emerging markets, to Turkey and even Black Sea countries risk. As the days passed, the real economy also started to flinch and in early 2009 the refinancing of Greece’s public debt (which according to 2007 data stood at 93.4 percent of GDP) was discovered to be quite a problem, while the spread between Greek government paper and German bonds widened to more than 250 basis points. Thus, all complacency vanished and Greece really ‘discovered’ the financial crisis in a scary way.
Obamania versus anti-Americanism
Greece
Greek Centre of European Studies and Research
The victory of Barack Obama – or, more accurately the irresistible ascent and finally the victory of Obama and the Democrats, along with the fall and almost collapse of President Bush and his brand of Republicans – has been more than approved by Greek public opinion (and the political system of Greece). The Europe-wide Obamania took root in Greece soon enough, but it has found especially fertile ground in the anti-American sediment that remains throughout Greek public opinion. One should not forget that on items of special Greek interest, such as the potential accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to NATO (with the “name issue” unsolved), or the recent Turkish incursions to the Aegean, US positions and/or de facto stances were perceived as inimical to Greece. Thus, expectations from an ‘Obama renaissance’ are high, although already voices of moderation (of such expectations) were taking over.[1]
Keep the light burning
Greece
Greek Centre of European Studies and Research
The institutional aspects of the future of the EU are mainly seen as ways in which Greece, a member state that considers itself to be increasingly marginalised or ‘under siege’ in the current EU setting, can afford and feel some degree of centrality within the European public discourse. Thus, both the post-Irish ‘No’ fate of the Lisbon Treaty and the road towards the elections to the European Parliament in June 2009, are viewed in this context. In academic discussions, as well as in the wider media, ways are sought that would allow for ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Even the methods provided for in the U.S. Constitution are enlisted so as to keep the light of the Lisbon Treaty burning.[1]
